Anamitra Chattopadhyay | India |

The record of journalist persecution that has emerged from the period of Muhammad Yunus\'s rule is nothing short of shocking.

Unprecedented Persecution of Journalists Under Yunus; Calls Grow for Nobel Prize to Be Revoked

The record of journalist persecution that has emerged from the period of Muhammad Yunus\'s rule is nothing short of shocking.

As head of Grameen Bank, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Many critics have long argued that Muhammad Yunus is the architect of a business model that profits by trapping the poorest people in poor countries in cycles of high-interest debt. Ever since that model received international recognition through the Nobel Prize, aided, according to critics, by the direct intervention of influential friends in the United States, controversy has surrounded both the award and the model itself.

After 18 months of governing Bangladesh, Yunus\'s actions have also come under intense scrutiny. His government suspended the country\'s vaccination programme. As a result, with herd immunity shattered, the number of child deaths from measles is reportedly approaching 600, while infections have surpassed one hundred thousand. Now, the record of journalist persecution under Yunus that has come to light is equally alarming. Many are demanding that the Nobel authorities revoke Yunus\'s Nobel Prize over what they describe as grave human rights violations.

After the departure of the Yunus government, journalists who had found themselves cornered, regardless of political affiliation, formed an organisation called the Anti-Persecution Journalists Front. Bringing together information from across the country, the organisation has compiled and published a detailed account of the alleged persecution.

According to the report, the Yunus government implicated more than 500 journalists in what it describes as fabricated criminal cases carrying severe charges, including murder. A statement issued by the organisation says: \"More than fifty journalists were arrested. Thirteen journalists were killed. In addition, around 1,200 journalists lost their jobs. Government accreditation cards of 168 professional journalists were revoked. Memberships of more than 700 journalists were cancelled or suspended by various press clubs, including the National Press Club.\"

Officials of the organisation state that during Yunus\'s tenure, 47 journalists across the country were arrested, including Shahriar Kabir, Mozammel Babu, Shyamal Dutta, Shakil Ahmed, Farzana Rupa, Sheikh Jamal, Manjurul Alam Panna and Anis Alamgir. Only a small number of them have since been released on bail. The organisation further alleges that 13 journalists, including Mehedi Hasan, Shakil Hossain, Tahir Zaman, ATM Turab, Pradip Kumar Bhowmik and Sohel Akhanji, were killed.

The Anti-Persecution Journalists Front also states that supporters of Yunus were responsible for acts of vandalism, attacks and arson targeting the offices of BTV, 71 TV, Somoy TV, DBC News, Gaan Bangla, ATN News, ATN Bangla, My TV, Bijoy TV, News24, and the newspapers Amader Orthoniti, Amader Notun Shomoy, Dainik Mukhopatro, Kaler Kantho, Bangladesh Pratidin, Daily Sun, Bangla News, Prothom Alo and The Daily Star.

According to the statement, editors, news chiefs and journalists from various media organisations were subjected to pressure, resulting in the dismissal of approximately 1,200 journalists during Yunus\'s administration.

Recently, journalists took to the streets of Dhaka, forming a human chain and demanding the withdrawal of all false cases filed against them. They called for the release of imprisoned journalists, justice for murdered journalists, reinstatement of those who lost their jobs, and the reopening of the offices of the two journalist organisations, DUJ and BFUJ.

They also demanded justice for looting and arson attacks on newspaper offices, restoration of memberships cancelled by press clubs across the country, including the National Press Club, reversal of accreditation card cancellations, withdrawal of orders freezing journalists\' bank accounts, and removal of restrictions imposed on their foreign travel.

Many campaigners are now characterising the organised persecution of journalists as a serious violation of human rights and are calling on the Nobel authorities to revoke Yunus\'s Nobel Prize. They argue that allowing such a ruler to continue being identified as a Nobel laureate damages the reputation and moral standing of the award itself.

The BNP government led by Tarique Rahman recently completed its first 100 days in office after winning the election. Although no new cases or attacks against journalists have been reported under the current administration, the cases filed during Yunus\'s tenure have not yet been withdrawn.

Police have reportedly failed to submit charge sheets against imprisoned journalists even after 18 to 20 months. Despite this, they have not been granted bail. In many instances, journalists who secured bail in existing cases have allegedly been implicated in new cases and kept behind bars.

During a meeting with editors, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman assured media representatives that his government does not believe in suppressing or controlling the press. He also promised to review the cases filed against journalists. However, according to critics, none of these commitments have been implemented during the government\'s first 100 days.

Akhtar Hossain, Convenor of the Anti-Persecution Journalists Front, said: \"The responsibility for releasing journalists imprisoned during the Yunus era and ending the persecution of journalists now lies with the current government. If it fails to fulfil that responsibility, it will be assumed that it has taken a position against journalists. Public expectations from a political government are high. Please free the journalists."

Anamitra Chattopadhyay is a senior journalist and columnist, formerly of Anandabazar Patrika and currently associated with Ei Samay. He specialises in Bangladesh affairs, South Asian politics and regional geopolitics.

Editorial note for PolicyGov: 
"The views expressed in this article are those of the author. The allegations cited are based on claims made by the Anti-Persecution Journalists Front and have not been independently verified by PolicyGov."
 

Prof Selim Raihan warns the deal raises serious questions about Bangladesh’s economic sovereignty and geopolitical balance

A trade agreement signed between Bangladesh and the United States on February 9 — just days before a national election — has triggered sharp criticism from economists and policy observers.

The Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, concluded by the interim government in the final days of its tenure, offers only a marginal reduction in US tariffs. Yet it binds Bangladesh to a sweeping framework covering defence, energy, trade, labour standards and digital governance.

“The agreement could reshape Bangladesh’s economic autonomy, geopolitical balance and long-term development path,” said Professor Selim Raihan, Executive Director of the South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM), in an extended interview.

Raihan described the deal as “highly unequal”, “rushed” and “potentially damaging” to Bangladesh’s strategic independence.

A Question of Timing

Raihan’s first concern centres on timing. The agreement was finalised by an interim administration just days before the election — a move he believes sets a troubling precedent.

“I do not understand why our interim government rushed to sign this agreement just before the election,” he said. “This should have been left to the newly elected government. Waiting one or two months would not have created major problems.”

He contrasted Bangladesh’s approach with India’s slower and more cautious negotiations with Washington.

“I was informed that India and the United States have not yet signed their trade agreement. If a country like India has not finalised such a deal, why were we in such a hurry?” he asked.

Raihan argued that an agreement of this magnitude required parliamentary scrutiny and broad consultation with exporters, business leaders and trade experts.

“Stakeholders were not properly consulted,” he said. “The process is deeply concerning.”

Imbalance in Obligations

One of Raihan’s strongest criticisms concerns the imbalance of commitments.

“In the 32-page document, the phrase ‘Bangladesh shall’ appears 158 times, while ‘the United States shall’ appears only nine times,” he noted. “This shows that most obligations fall on Bangladesh.”

Under the agreement, Bangladesh will open its market to approximately 6,700 US products — including chemicals, medical devices, machinery, ICT equipment, motor vehicles, beef and poultry. In contrast, the US grants duty-free or preferential access to around 2,500 Bangladeshi items.

In return, Washington reduces its reciprocal tariff on Bangladeshi exports from 20 percent to 19 percent.

“For a trade agreement between the most powerful economy in the world and one of the weakest economies among least developed countries, this is highly unequal,” Raihan said.

“The weaker country is offering more, while the superpower is offering less. Bangladesh is effectively granting special and differential treatment to the United States.”

Strategic and Sovereignty Concerns

Beyond trade, Raihan raised concerns about provisions that may constrain Bangladesh’s policy autonomy.

The agreement requires Bangladesh to endeavour to increase purchases of US military equipment and restrict procurement from certain countries — language widely interpreted as targeting China. It also allows Washington to terminate the deal if Bangladesh signs trade agreements with countries classified as non-market economies.

“In areas such as defence procurement and trade relations with other countries, Bangladesh may effectively require US endorsement,” Raihan said. “This raises concerns about sovereign decision-making.”

The deal also emphasises “economic and national security alignment,” which Raihan described as potentially intrusive.

“This is not just about trade. It is geopolitics,” he said. “Bangladesh is vulnerable in global geopolitical competition, and we must be careful.”

Risk to Non-Aligned Status

Raihan warned that the agreement could gradually shift Bangladesh away from its long-standing non-aligned foreign policy stance.

One provision requires Bangladesh to adopt complementary restrictive measures if the US imposes border or trade actions on national security grounds. Critics argue this could effectively bind Dhaka to US sanctions regimes.

“If the United States bans products from certain countries, Bangladesh may be expected to support that,” Raihan said. “This could alter our non-aligned position.”

Managing relations with China — Bangladesh’s largest import partner — would become particularly complex.

“China is our largest import source, yet the US has ongoing trade conflicts with China,” he said. “If Bangladesh is pressured to reduce imports from China, it will be extremely difficult. We need balanced relations with everyone — China, India, the US and others.”

‘Zero Tariff’ Confusion

Raihan also criticised what he called misleading communication about tariff benefits.

“When officials spoke of ‘zero tariff’ for products using US cotton, it actually refers to zero reciprocal tariff — not total tariff removal,” he explained. “The original Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariff remains.”

Many exporters reportedly misunderstood the provision as full tariff elimination.

Managed Trade and Financial Pressure

Another major concern is the shift toward what Raihan describes as “managed trade”.

Bangladesh has committed to purchasing approximately $15 billion worth of US liquefied natural gas over 15 years, alongside increased imports of aircraft and agricultural goods.

This includes plans for Biman Bangladesh Airlines to purchase 14 Boeing aircraft and at least $3.5 billion in US agricultural products such as wheat, soybeans and cotton.

“The idea is to reduce the bilateral trade deficit,” Raihan said. “But this means importing more from the United States regardless of competitive pricing.”

He warned that Bangladesh could be compelled to buy higher-cost goods even when cheaper alternatives exist.

“This will put additional pressure on foreign exchange reserves,” he said. “How will we finance aircraft purchases and energy imports? There is a risk of increased reliance on foreign loans.”

Labour and Regulatory Changes

The agreement also requires amendments to labour laws, including expanded union rights and bringing export processing zones under national labour standards within two years.

“Labour is a very sensitive issue in Bangladesh,” Raihan said. “If these provisions create uncertainty among investors, particularly in the garment sector, it could create serious problems.”

He further expressed concern about clauses requiring Bangladesh to recognise US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approvals for pharmaceuticals and medical devices — potentially weakening domestic regulatory authority.

Limited Positives

Despite his criticisms, Raihan acknowledged some potential benefits.

“There is a positive area in addressing non-tariff barriers,” he said. “But reforms should apply universally, not just for one country.”

Reducing bureaucratic inefficiencies could benefit both domestic and foreign businesses, he added.

A Dilemma for the Next Government

Raihan believes the agreement will present a significant challenge for the incoming administration.

“The next government will already face domestic political and economic pressures,” he said. “They may seek a review rather than outright cancellation.”

Cancelling the deal could harm Bangladesh’s credibility.

“Signing and then cancelling sends a negative signal to trading partners,” he noted.

Yet moving forward would lock Bangladesh into long-term financial and strategic commitments.

“The pressure will remain — financial, strategic and geopolitical,” Raihan said.

“We need everyone — China, India, the United States and others. Maintaining that balance is crucial for Bangladesh’s future.”

Selim Raihan

12 February 2026, 00:00 AM

The Daily Start 

Three features distinguish the upcoming national election in ways rarely seen before: the resurgence of Jamaat-e-Islami, the rise of Tarique Rahman as a central figure in contemporary politics, and—unthinkable until August 2024—the sidelining of the Awami League from the electoral contest.

Since its role during the Liberation War—when it opposed the birth of Bangladesh, aided the Pakistan Army in committing genocide, and collaborated with al-Badr and al-Shams in the killing of intellectuals—Jamaat-e-Islami has remained one of the most controversial actors in our political history. Its refusal to apologise explicitly for its role in 1971 or seek forgiveness from the people of Bangladesh has long rendered its political acceptability deeply questionable.

Its current position, articulated by party chief Dr Shafiqur Rahman—that “if we have committed any mistake since 1947 till date, we apologise for it”—is telling. By avoiding any direct reference to 1971, Jamaat continues to evade accountability for opposing the independence struggle and acting against the aspirations of freedom-loving people. This refusal remains among the most tragic aspects of our political journey.

Yet despite this legacy, Jamaat is today a formidable presence in the upcoming election. Opinion polls suggest it may emerge as the second-largest party in the next parliament. How did a party burdened with such a past manage this resurgence?

The most significant factor is Jamaat’s strategic mobilisation of the growing consciousness of Muslim identity among the majority of Bangladeshis, positioning itself as its most authentic representative. This was made possible by the failure of the two centrist parties—the Awami League in particular, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to a lesser extent—to firmly entrench a durable tradition of nationalistic and secular politics in the public imagination.

Both parties governed the country since 1991, yet their performance increasingly alienated voters. The Awami League’s corrupt, exploitative, and oppressive rule over more than fifteen years—ending in August 2024—proved especially damaging. Ironically, a party whose legitimacy was rooted in its role in 1971 squandered that moral capital, opening space for Jamaat’s political rehabilitation.

Jamaat’s ideological consistency, organisational discipline, and the dedication of its grassroots activists have further strengthened its position. Its long-term infiltration of Chhatra League structures, sometimes even assuming second-tier leadership roles, demonstrates strategic patience and organisational skill. Shibir’s recent victories in student union elections at five public universities further underline this success. Reports also suggest that Jamaat’s female grassroots workers have been particularly effective in door-to-door campaigning.

In this context, Jamaat’s electoral ally, the National Citizen Party (NCP), also warrants attention. Born out of the July uprising, NCP entered electoral politics amid high expectations. Its decision to align with the Jamaat-led bloc may prove consequential—both in the immediate election and for its long-term political identity.

The second defining feature of this election is the rise of Tarique Rahman. Though long regarded as the heir apparent, the scale and speed of his ascent have been striking. Operating from London for years while his mother remained incarcerated, he managed to keep the BNP not only alive but disciplined and cohesive—no small feat under relentless repression.

Tarique Rahman’s direct communication with grassroots leaders through mobile and internet platforms fostered loyalty and pride among younger BNP activists. Repeated attempts by the Awami League to fracture the party or co-opt senior leaders were thwarted by his persuasive engagement. Fifteen years is a long time in Bangladeshi politics, and the BNP’s survival through that period is a testament to his organisational capacity.

Many felt he delayed his return to Bangladesh after the fall of the Awami League government. Yet when he did return, the impact was immediate. His presence electrified party workers, energised supporters, and restored confidence. Massive public turnouts and warm receptions at his appearances have made him a central force in the electoral landscape.

Thus far, he has conducted himself with restraint and maturity. His speeches have been measured, forward-looking, and policy-oriented—standing in contrast to the rhetoric-heavy approach of many others. Whether he has translated this momentum into effective nationwide campaign organisation will become clear only after the polls. But he has convincingly stepped into the political space once occupied by his late mother, whose janaza remains a powerful reminder of the affection and respect she commanded.

The third and perhaps most consequential feature of this election is the effective exclusion of the Awami League. The party has not been formally banned, but its political activities have been. How could a party so integral to the birth and history of Bangladesh become so vulnerable as to be sidelined from a national election?

The reasons are many—extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances—but the decisive factor lies in the brutal street violence during the final weeks of its rule. One incident encapsulates this collapse of legitimacy: the killing of Abu Sayed, an unarmed university student standing alone, posing no threat, shot dead by police. That single act symbolised the moral and political implosion of the regime.

The government’s subsequent conduct—tampering with autopsy reports, attempting justification instead of accountability, and continuing the killing of demonstrators—sealed its fate. The loss was total: public trust, credibility, and legitimacy. The ban on AL’s activities flowed directly from this record.

Where Awami League voters will shift their support on February 12 may well determine the election’s outcome.

An additional feature worth noting is the eclipse of the Jatiya Party, once dominant under General HM Ershad and consistently the third-largest force in parliament since 1990. Its marginalisation reflects the profound restructuring underway in Bangladesh’s political order.

Elections are always pivotal in a democracy. This year, however, they carry exceptional weight. Bangladesh urgently needs stability, predictability, an end to mobocracy, renewed investment, and restored public safety. These can only begin with an elected parliament, an accountable government, capable policymakers, and a clear national vision.

We conclude with a warning drawn from experience. While we are enthusiastic about elections, we have historically been unwilling to accept defeat. Losing candidates accept results more readily than losing parties—those that fail to form the government often delegitimise the process itself. We have seen this repeatedly, even under caretaker governments.

As we once observed, the mindset has been: an election is free and fair if we win, but rigged if we lose. This attitude must end.

It is our sincere hope that all political actors accept the outcome with grace and dignity. If there are fact-based grounds for challenge, pursue them through the mechanisms laid down by the Election Commission. Do not resort to chaos or disruption. The nation must move forward—peacefully and urgently.

Here’s to a free, fair, and peaceful election.

Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star.
Views expressed are the author’s own.